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INTRODUCTION
Drafting a statute that addresses the challenges posed by "digital
age" communications requires thoroughgoing revision to the traditional
role for not just federal, but also state regulation. The traditional
"separate and dual" regulatory authority dating back to the
Communications Act of 1934, and even the hybrid approach of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, must give way to a more consistent,
principled appreciation for the purposes of administrative regulation and
the technological realities of modern networks.
This article flows out of a Working Group report of the Digital Age
Communications Act (DACA) project, in which various experts from
around the country have examined and proposed solutions to pressing
issues in communications reform The overall DACA regulatory
framework, which is rooted in competition policy,' calls for a
reconception of the roles of both federal and state regulators.
First and foremost, the Working Group endeavored to follow
DACA's paradigm shift from "legislative regulation" to "rule of law
regulation." By this, the Working Group envisioned that
telecommunications regulation - at whatever governmental level - would
follow a more formal, largely adjudicatory method in accord with pre-
announced legal standards and rules. The current legislative regulation
model, by contrast, operates within the broad, undefined mandate of the
"public interest" standard that lends itself to legislative-type rulemakings,
informal procedures and murky compromises. A rule of law regulation
model is better suited to a competitive environment, promotes
investment (because of its regularity and predictability), and limits rent-
seeking opportunities because its process is less open-ended and
indeterminate.
Second, the Working Group reallocates the respective duties and
powers between federal and state regulatory entities. In line with
DACA's basic premises and current policy trends, the overall structure
and direction of communications regulation outlined in this report is
federal. This orientation reflects the need for a unitary regulatory
framework that matches the technological reality of competitive,
geographically unconstrained, packet-based networks. Likewise, the
emphasis on a single federal framework reflects our judgment that
communications policy should be a subset of general competition policy,
which largely resides at the federal level. Finally, a single overarching
federal framework is necessary to avoid patchwork regulation and
1. See PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., PROPOSAL OF THE REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK WORKING GROUP RELEASE 1.0 (2005), http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/other/050617regframework.pdf.
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spillover effects from state regulation.
In developing our report, the Working Group received a wide array
of input, including contributions from a session of the National
Association of Regulatory Utilities Commissioners. With that input,
and with further deliberation among the Working Group members, we
revised our earlier work2 and have finalized our report. In so doing, we
both refine some of our earlier conclusions and add some additional
points specifically related to local government regulation of
telecommunications services.
In this report, the Working Group proposes the following
framework for state and local regulation in three broad areas:
Rate Regulation-States initially will retain the authority to keep a
basic local residential service rate. All other state rate regulation and the
attendant regulatory mechanisms, however, will be preempted in favor of
a general competition policy mandate superintended by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or Commission). The
recommended statutory language contains a petitioning process whereby
even this rate will fade away unless the FCC finds evidence of "unfair
competition" pursuant to DACA's Title I-Regulatory Framework.
Competition Poicy Adjudication-The Working Group is split on
this issue. Some Working Group members prefer that all unfair
competition adjudication take place under the auspices of the FCC and
that states be precluded from acting as competition policy adjudicators.
Other members hold that the FCC should have the discretion to
delegate "unfair competition" adjudications based on allegations
occurring entirely within a state to the relevant state commission.
Consumer Fraud and Other Issues-The Working Group is largely
content with the current allocation of these duties, where the states may
act consistently with a federal standard. The Working Group, however,
prefers a more exacting standard than now exists under Section 332 of
the Communications Act because it wants to prevent "spillover" effects
from overzealous state regulation in the name of consumer protection.
State authority to engage in "consumer protection" will thus be confined
to "unfair or deceptive practices" under the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) Act model. In addition, the proposed legislation would delegate
to states and localities authority to promote public safety and homeland
2. For the initial version of the Working Group's report, see PROGRESS & FREEDOM
FOUND., PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON FEDERAL-STATE
FRAMEWORK RELEASE 1.0 (2005), http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/books/050721daca-fed-
state-report.pdf.
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security and to manage public rights-of-way, subject to federal law and
other constraints. New franchises are eliminated in favor of granting
states discretion to impose streamlined, statewide certification
requirements. Any state fees for access to rights-of-way would be
limited to the costs of such access.
In essence, the Working Group concludes that federal law should
set forth a coherent framework that circumscribes the role of state and
local authorities so as to advance sound competition policy goals. In so
doing, it recognizes that a basic local service rate retains both political
and practical appeal during the initial stages of communications reform.
Similarly, the Working Group believes that current state alternative
dispute resolution procedures and other processes for solving consumer
fraud problems work reasonably well. The group therefore retains these
delegations as a matter of statute, but makes clear that state consumer
protection efforts cannot spillover into adjacent jurisdictions or be used
as a pretext for economic regulation.
In developing this framework, the Working Group endeavored to
reach a reasonable consensus among its members as to how to develop a
strategy for implementing the basic vision of the Digital Age
Communications Act. Ultimately, however, no Working Group
member or co-chair agreed with all aspects of this approach, although all
agreed that it improved upon the Telecommunications Act of 1996's
allocation of jurisdictional authority. Where possible, we highlight
notable areas of agreement and the logic behind different trade-offs
made by the Working Group. Notably, in the case of whether to
delegate competition policy administration to state agencies, we could
not reach a final resolution and set forth two alternative approaches.
I. BACKGROUND
Telecommunications regulation raises both substantive and
institutional questions. All too often, however, policymakers focus on
the substantive questions-say, what standards to use to justify
competition policy measures-at the expense of a more careful evaluation
of the institutional mechanisms they might chose to advance those goals.
In the case of the responsibilities assigned to federal, state, and local
entities, the lack of careful thinking in developing the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 led to legal uncertainty, tension
between the different governmental authorities, and continuing
litigation.
A thoughtful and practical framework for federal, state and local
relations in this context must address two primary considerations.
First, the framework must decide the degree to which federal, state
and local authority should derive from an integrated national scheme or,
[Vol. 4
2006] DIGITAL AGE COMMUNICA TIONSACT(DACA) 325
alternatively, from distinct schemes that govern each separate
jurisdiction. This degree of integration can be calibrated, among other
ways, through (1) federal preemption of state or local regulation; (2)
delegations of authority, possibly in nuanced ways that would require
state and local regulatory authority to conform to federal legal rules; or
(3) "savings clauses" protecting state or local autonomy from federal
interference. Notably, a typical savings clause preserves authority "not
inconsistent" with a law's regulatory goals. In this respect, the tradition
of preserving state rate-making authority represents a notable departure
from an integrated framework insofar as it prevents the FCC from
setting policy related to "intrastate rates."
Second, the framework must address, in a self-conscious manner,
the scope of state and local authority with respect to so-called "social
policy goals" that are distinct from potential economic regulation. These
goals may pertain to such things as consumer protection, public safety,
homeland security and management of public rights-of-way. With
respect to obligations imposed on providers to address social policy goals,
an ideal framework would allow for some diversity and experimentation
while precluding spillover effects or inconsistencies with federal law.
In the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress adopted what
might be generously termed "a hybrid strategy." As to its mission of
opening local markets to competition (accomplished through the
regulation of interconnection and wholesale markets), Congress provided
the FCC with residual authority to oversee all aspects of this regulatory
program, inviting state agencies to interpret and implement federal
regulatory policy. At the same time, Congress left intact the traditional
protection of state regulatory authority codified by section 2(b) of the
1934 Communications Act. With respect to developing standards for
economic and social policy matters, Congress largely elided over this
distinction, leaving unsettled numerous matters related to the respective
roles of state and federal agencies and paving the way for litigation and
legal uncertainty.
The advent of digital technologies in general and the Internet, in
particular, continue to undermine the legal distinctions embodied in the
1996 Act. On account of the Internet's transformative effect on
communications markets and the clear trend of technological
convergence, the historic distinctions between interstate and intrastate
services are evaporating. Moreover, given that Internet services-such as
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)-are national (and even
international) in scope, there are increasing risks associated with allowing
states to regulate telecommunications outside a unifying federal
regulatory regime. For social policy concerns, however, there is an
increasing recognition that matters ranging from universal service
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concerns to consumer fraud to E-911 and emergency services will require
the involvement of state and local authorities, even if some national
standards will be appropriate and necessary.
This Report, anticipating that the current Internet developments are
only the beginning of a massive transformation in communications
markets, proposes a new charter for federal, state, and local cooperation
under a Digital Age Communications Act (DACA). This charter, as
suggested above, would explicitly integrate federal and state authority,
thus replacing the 1996 Act's less-than-self-conscious approach and its
retention of section 2(b). Moreover, this charter would make clear, with
important limitations, that state agencies should be given greater
solicitude on matters of social policy than on economic policy. It is
envisioned that this approach will facilitate thoughtful policy decisions
that would be made by the actor in the best institutional position to do
SO.
II. ALTERNATIVES TO AN INTEGRATED REGIME
Before explaining the virtues and powerful rationale for an
integrated regulatory system, we will first outline its two polar
alternatives: (A) the historic system of separate and dual authority, and
(B) a federal preemption model. For the reasons explained below, we
found each alternative lacking in fundamental respects. Though we
present these alternatives as polar opposites, we do not mean to present a
false dichotomy or a means to make our integrated model more
respectable. (Indeed, some members preferred the preemption option
with respect to competition policy issues.) Rather, the poles of
preemption, on the one hand, and separate and dual authority, on the
other, serve to illustrate the conceivable models for a federal-state
framework going-forward.
A. Unconstrained State and Local Regulation
Since the enactment of the Communications Act of 1934, federal
telecommunications law has emphasized that state agencies must be
permitted to regulate "intrastate" telecommunications services. Indeed,
Congress enacted section 2(b) of the 1934 Act3 to reverse the Supreme
Court's decision in the so-called Shreveport Rate Case,4 which provided
broad authority to the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate
3. This section reads "nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or to give the
[FCC] jurisdiction with respect to ... charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or
regulations for or in connection with intrastate communication service.... 47 U.S.C. §
152(b) (1934).
4. Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States [hereinafter Shreveport Rate Case],
234 U.S. 342 (1914).
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telecommunications.' In particular, the Shreveport Rate Case concluded
that the Interstate Commerce Commission could regulate intrastate
telephone service because of its effect on interstate commerce.6
To limit the scope of federal authority, the 1934 Act instituted what
has become known as a "separations" model, under which states are free
to regulate the so-called "intrastate" aspects of communications unless it
would be "impossible" to separate those aspects from interstate services.
From 1934 to 1996, regulatory agencies and the courts frequently
considered where to draw the line between federal and state authority,7
with the United States Supreme Court ultimately setting forth the logic
and requirements of the separations model in 1986 in Louisiana PSC v.
FCC. In so doing, the Court recognized that the 1934 Act's regime was
unstable, noting "while the Act would seem to divide the world of
domestic telephone service neatly, into two hemispheres ... in practice,
the realities of technology and economics belie such a clean parceling of
responsibility."
In the 1996 Act, Congress did not address clearly the jurisdictional
relationship between federal and state authority, leading to a round of
litigation as to whether the classic model of separated authority applied
to the initiative of promoting local competition through the regulation of
interconnection and wholesale markets. In Iowa AT&T v. Utilities
Board, the Supreme Court made clear that the 1996 Act's new
requirements followed what is generally referred to as "cooperative
federalism." 10 Nonetheless, the 1996 Act left section 2(b) in place,
allowing state agencies to maintain complete control over "intrastate"
services. This regime, as the Supreme Court's Louisiana PSC decision
anticipated, has faced constant pressure from a dynamic marketplace
whose services increasingly do not follow geographic boundaries. Thus,
for this model to function going forward, federal and state regulatory
authorities would need to develop a re-energized use of a "separations
process" that, among other things, would allocate jointly used resources
5. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355,372 (1986) ("[Section 2(b)] was
proposed and supported by the state commissions in reaction to what they perceived to be the
evil of excessive federal regulation of intrastate service such as was sanctioned by the
Shreveport Rate Case.").
6. Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 353.
7. See, e.g., N.C. Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787, 793-95 (4th Cir. 1976)
(upholding FCC preemption of state regulations that would impede implementation of federal
CPE interconnection requirements).
8. 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
9. Id. at 360.
10. 525 U.S. 366 (1999). For a description of cooperative federalism in the context of the
1996 Act, see Philip J. Weiser, Cooperative Federalism, Federal Common Law, and the
Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692 (2001), available at
http://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/pubpdfs/weiser/CoopFederalism.pdf.
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between the two jurisdictions in a manner fit for a technologically
dynamic era.1'
Advantages. Creating a zone in which states can regulate
unconstrained by federal law has certain advantages. Along the lines that
motivated the enactment of section 2(b) in 1934, a separations model
respects the longstanding tradition of a separate sphere for non-federal
regulation and thus adheres to the ideal of a "dual federalism."
Moreover, this approach seeks to minimize the degree of coordination
(and thus litigation or other conflict) between state and federal regulators
because such coordination would be limited primarily to managing the
separations process. In so doing, this approach emphasizes the value of
state experimentation in developing local solutions and remaining
accountable for their success (or failure). This approach both minimizes
the risk of a single suboptimal national policy and facilitates the
development of optimal regulatory solutions that can be adopted
nationwide.
Disadvantages. The separations model also involves significant
disadvantages. Although this model respects the value of state
autonomy, it downplays the importance of interstate spillovers that are
often better addressed through national regulation. In particular, for
industries like communications that substantially involve activities that
cross city and state lines, it is often difficult to preserve an independent
regulatory sphere for states and localities to regulate outside of a federal
regulatory framework.
The evolution of modern communications technology continues to
undermine the case for state autonomy and bolsters that of the value of
national oversight as an aspect of interstate commerce. As former
California PUC Commissioner Susan Kennedy put it, "[t]he interstate
nature of many emerging communications technologies argues strongly
for a national regulatory framework."12  In particular, multiple
technological trends are eroding the once clear distinction between local
and long distance services: the cost of communicating is becoming more
distance insensitive; geographic boundaries are irrelevant to emerging
technology, intelligence and functions are migrating away from the
central office (the delocalization of the central office); the relevant
11. The FCC has largely declined to address the challenges in reforming the separations
process for a new technological era. See Jurisdictional Separations Reform and Referral to the
Federal-State Joint Board, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 FCC Rcd 22,120, 22,126
(1997) (noting that "today's network architecture and service offerings differ in many
important ways from the network and services" that spawned current separations process,
constructed at a time when services were provided "through a regulated monopoly").
12. Susan Kennedy, Federal and State Regulatory Responsibilities in a National
Communications Market 1 (2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www.naruc.org/associations/1773/files/LTF-susankennedypaper.pdf).
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networks as well as the services that ride on these networks are
increasingly comprised of numerous component parts (e.g., those offered
by different providers); packet-routed networks are becoming more
prevalent than circuit-switched networks; and the application (e.g., voice)
is becoming more independent and separate from the network.
13
In sum, the ability to regulate intrastate services distinctly from
interstate ones is increasingly difficult to sustain with respect to digital
age communications networks, which increasingly revolve around the
Internet and wireless technologies. As the FCC stated in concluding
that Vonage's Voice over Internet Protocol offering was subject to federal
jurisdiction, communications services are increasingly "designed to
overcome geography, not track it." 4 Thus, any attempt to allow states
and localities to try to "isolate" and then regulate aspects of these services
risks distorting or impeding the evolution of modern communications
networks as well as creating significant spillover effects. Finally, the
competition policy maxim of promoting competition, not individual
competitors is not always grasped by state regulators (or federal ones for
that matter).
B. Preempted State and Local Regulation
For industries that are national in character and involve
interdependent services, Congress often adopts a national regulatory
regime that leaves no role for state administration. Such regimes,
ranging from the regulation of retirement benefits (in ERISA) to airlines
(in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978), place a high value on
uniformity and predictability, thereby discounting the possibility that
local administration could produce better results either through closer
proximity to consumers or the possibility of experimentation with
distinct approaches. In telecommunications, there are only limited
elements of a preemption strategy, such as the 1996 Act's categorical
stance against state-created barriers to entry."5
Advantages. The advantages of the preemption model mirror the
disadvantages of the unconstrained model and vice-versa. The
preemption model gives full weight to national policy to set forth a
uniform policy and process to govern all communications networks and
services, regardless of boundaries. By providing such uniformity, this
13. Douglas C. Sicker, The End of Federalism In Telecommunications Regulation?, 3
NW. J. OF TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 130 (2005), avaiable at
http://www.law.northwestem.edu/journals/njtip/v3/n2/3.
14. Vonage Holding Companies Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of
the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 19 FCC Rcd.
22,404, 25 (2004).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 253 (1996).
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model would seek to maximize regulatory certainty and promote
investment and innovation in new, cross-boundary networks and
services. Moreover, the preemption model arguably eliminates the need
for coordination among federal, state and local regulators, thus avoiding
the complexities of separations.
A preemption model can overcome certain parochial interests that
tend to take root with state regulation. Though there is not an entirely
clear answer as to where consumer-harming rent-seeking is more
pervasive, a casual survey of state regulatory activity - from airlines, to
intrastate trucking, to motor vehicle dealers, to various professional
licensing schemes - suggests that state regulation can be more easily and
cheaply turned to benefit private, rather than public, ends. This is not to
say that federal regulation is devoid of rent seeking. The history of the
FCC itself belies such a claim. Nonetheless, the opportunities for forum
shopping and costly state-by-state regulatory lobbying campaigns appear
to be lessened, or at least refocused, in a preemption model.
There is also historical precedent recommending state preemption.
Preemption of state regulation under a uniform deregulatory federal
scheme resulted in large consumer welfare gains in other network
industries: airlines, trucking, railroads and natural gas production. In
those cases, preemption allowed the interests of consumers to triumph
over the interests of regulated industries, which often act as the fiercest
defenders of state regulation because the regulation can be turned to their
advantage.
Disadvantages. Preempting state and local regulation downplays
the values of regulatory federalism. By wresting power from states, this
approach would disrupt state resources already devoted to
telecommunications regulation, thereby generating dislocation and a
significant re-orientation in telecommunications policy. This shift of
authority would downplay the value of the states' institutional
competencies and underestimate the challenges that would arise from the
lack of federal resources and competencies to address all circumstances in
which government involvement might be warranted. In particular, state
agencies are already using administrative law judges and adjudicative-like
procedures (along the lines envisioned by the Regulatory Framework set
forth in Title I) more effectively than the FCC. Finally, a preemption
approach precludes states and localities from experimenting with
different regulatory solutions, even where state and local involvement
may aid (or at least not hinder) the achievement of federal policy goals.
If the nature and conditions in telecommunications markets were
relatively uniform, say, along the lines of airline safety standards, a
preemption approach would not raise many of the above concerns. But,
in reality, the economics of telecommunications networks underscores
[Vol. 4
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that their rollout and use-along with the associated competitive
consequences-differs between jurisdictions. In particular, given the
notable variations in population density and economic wherewithal
across the U.S., the relevant marketplace fundamentals are likely to differ
considerably. Indeed, despite the impact of wireless and broadband
technologies, the cost characteristics of local networks will remain
distance and terrain sensitive for the foreseeable future. Consequently,
this view holds that sound regulation will require sensitivity to local
conditions that can best be achieved through a continued reliance on
state and local authorities. Notably, a belief that states can effectively
recognize and implement competition policy standards consistent with
local conditions rests on an assumption of the competence and fidelity of
state commissions toward a "rule of law" regulatory model. This relies on
an empirical judgment about state regulatory commissions' respective
abilities and histories, which given a wide variance in performance, is not
indisputably clear.
Despite the appeal of a federal regulatory framework, the rationale
for a continued state role cannot be ignored. The conditions that
allowed for broadly preemptive federal roles in other network industries
are not present in communications. For one, in no industry, save
communications, has the state role in rate regulation-and specifically
rate regulation in pursuit of "universal service" goals-been so pervasive.
This means that state reliance interests remain strong for some continued
regulatory role. The ultimate question is whether states have the capacity
and ability to act to enhance consumer welfare under a competition
policy framework. This requires a predictive judgment about the ability
of state regulation to transform from a legislative regulator to a rule of
law regulator.
The ability of states to transition to a regime guided by rule of law
values colors one's enthusiasm for a more preemptive or integrated
regime. Significantly, however, the preemptive model is not free from
criticism on this ground, as there is reason to believe that the FCC
cannot be easily transformed from a legislative to a rule of law regulator.
In particular, the legislative regulation model the FCC now follows has a
large constituency supporting it and it will not die without a fight.
Accordingly, the predictive judgment as to which regulatory institutions
can make the transition to a rule of law model more effectively is not
immediately dear, meaning that involving states in competition policy
judgments provides the important benefit of enabling diverse institutions
to make the transition to a rule of law model at the same time and to
create benchmarks for one another to follow (or avoid).
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III. AN INTEGRATED REGIME OF FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITY
The most significant debate among Working Group members
focused on a choice between establishing an integrated regime of federal,
state and local authority or, alternatively, broad preemption of state and
local regulation. Such broad preemption no doubt would eliminate many
of the shortcomings arising from the current statute's attempt to divide
federal, state and local authority into separate spheres. Broad
preemption also, however, would ignore the strong interests, institutional
competencies and other practical considerations weighing in favor of
some ongoing state and local involvement.
Upon reflection, the Working Group concludes that a self-
conscious commitment to an integrated regulatory framework would best
promote sound telecommunications policymaking. Under such a model,
states and localities would be permitted to regulate only within spheres
authorized by the federal government. This authority involves both an
explicit delegation of authority-as exists, for example, under the 1996
Act's interconnection agreement regime' 6-and a tolerance (through a
"savings clause") for states to act in ways that do not affect other states
and are "not inconsistent" with federal regulatory policy.1 7 In essence,
this model reflects a "cooperative federalism" strategy that involves
federal, state and local regulators in implementing broad federal policy
goals.18 As outlined in the introduction, we envision three distinct
approaches for addressing (A) the extent to which state agencies should
continue to set local "intrastate" rates; (B) whether and how states should
help manage competition policy other than rate regulation (e.g.,
interconnection); and (C) how much discretion state agencies should
enjoy in protecting consumers as well as addressing social policy goals.
We will address each in turn.
A. Rate Regulation
The historic role played by section 2(b) of the Communications Act
of 1934 was to protect state authority from federal oversight. During an
era when the separation of responsibility between federal and state
16. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 251, 252 (1996).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 261(c) (1996). This proviso states: "Nothing in this part precludes a
State from imposing requirements on a telecommunications carrier for intrastate services that
are necessary to further competition in the provision of telephone exchange service or exchange
access, as long as the State's requirements are not inconsistent with this part or the
Commission's regulations to implement this part."
18. For a thorough discussion of cooperative federalism regulatory regimes, see Weiser,
Cooperative Federahsm, Federal Common Law, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act,
supra note 10, passinr, Philip J. Weiser, Towards A Constitutional Architecture for
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663 (2001); Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative
Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1999).
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authority could be managed reasonably well, this approach enabled state
agencies to maintain their authority over an island of "intrastate rates."
This model, however, is not built for an era of Internet Protocal (IP)-
enabled services where different broadband facilities support bundled
offerings of services that-even for the once "local telephone service"-
routinely cross state boundaries and are intricately related with one
another. Consider, for example, that with the rapid declines in transport
costs, many competitive providers are already relying on switching
equipment far from the local calling area in question. In a world where
the geographic endpoints of a call can be easily determined (as was the
case in the traditional circuit switched environment), the classification of
intra-state versus inter-state services could be accomplished without
much difficulty (regardless of how the call was routed). But with the
advent of IP services (such as Voice over Internet Protocol) and an
increasing reliance on wireless networks, the location of one or both ends
of a telephone call is increasingly difficult to determine.
In calling for the abolition of the section 2(b) approach, we are
mindful that state oversight of ratemaking questions has played an
important role in telecommunications policy. In particular, state
authorities have undertaken local fact-finding and have addressed
concerns about the reasonableness of the rates charged for
telecommunications services on a market-by-market basis and whether
they are constrained by local competition. Moreover, we recognize that
many state legislatures and state agencies are thoughtfully re-examining
the merits of continued rate regulation for markets increasingly
characterized by competitive entry.
The Working Group is also mindful of the damage that
overextended state rate regulation can cause. In most states, the rate
structure did not derive from any measure of the cost of a given service,
but rather as part of a universal service scheme. Thus, state rates were,
and often remain, geographically averaged without regard to cost, as well
as pervaded by cross-subsidies benefiting rural and residential consumers
and burdening urban and business consumers. In turn, this rate structure
offered distorted price signals to new market entrants in the wake of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. Accordingly, the state-regulated rate
structure induced upstream distortions in the regulated wholesale rate
structure until there was little hope of discovering a "market" price
anywhere in the communications sector. A truly competitive, market-
driven communications market will thus eschew rate regulation at both
the retail and wholesale level, unless absolutely necessary.
The Working Group embraces a two-prong approach to rate
regulation. First, for the most part, all future rate regulation is lifted and
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heretofore impermissible." Second, as an initial matter, rate regulation
of basic local services that fall within the definition of a service supported
by universal service under Section 254(c) of the 1996 Act-i.e., are
viewed as essential utility type services-are grandfathered until the
conclusion of state and federal proceedings to determine whether such
rate regulation is justified in specific markets.20
The Working Group sees the initial retention of a basic service rate
as a concession to immediate practical and political considerations, and
therefore we also enact a petitioning process whereby this rate may also
be ended in favor of a market process. Specifically, for the grandfathered
basic services eligible for continued rate regulation, the Working Group
proposes a mechanism for parties to petition for either the lifting of
current regulation or the imposition of new regulation. In particular, any
petition to reform current rate structures must be filed with the relevant
state agency. That agency will have 270 days to act on this petition, and
to determine whether its regulatory regime is consistent with DACA's
Title I unfair competition standard, before it is deemed granted.
Whether the petition is denied, granted by a decision, or granted by
operation of law, any party can appeal such an outcome to the Federal
Communications Commission. In the event that a party appeals a state
agency's decision, the FCC will have 180 days to determine whether or
not the presence or absence of state regulation is appropriate based on
Title I's "unfair competition" standard. If the FCC fails to act within
that time, any aggrieved party can file a petition directly with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for D.C. Circuit.
In calling for an evaluation of rate regulation of basic
telecommunications services based on whether it is justified under an
"unfair competition" standard, we envision the development of a
competition-based justification for rate regulation through a "common
law-like" process involving the state agencies and the FCC. At a
minimum, this process would call for real world market analyses and
sensitivity to the continuing development of new forms of competition to
traditional wireline telephony. That said, to the extent "unfair
competition" exists in certain markets, this process would offer state
agencies an opportunity to continue to perform their traditional role of
protecting consumers from unreasonable rates for essential
19. The obvious exception is, as discussed below, any rate regulation justified under
DACA's Title I's "unfair competition" standard.
20. The grandfathered state rate regulation for basic services and services supported under
Section 254(c) is not meant to provide an ongoing lever for continued rate regulation, even if
the definition of supported services under 254(c) (or its statutory successor) expands. Rather,
this provision is meant to be a strict grandfathering clause. Only basic service rates in effect at
the time of the passage of this DACA can remain in effect. Of course, a state on its own
initiative can cease regulating this rate as well.
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telecommunications services.
In recommending the approach set out above, we recognize the
appeal of the alternative model of requiring all rate regulation to be lifted
immediately (or within the very near term), with rate regulation being
reimposed only where, when, and to the extent an aggrieved party can
demonstrate consumer harm that can be remedied only by rate
regulation.2 Although this approach has much to commend it, we
conclude that-particularly given the dose scrutiny now being applied to
most state regulatory regimes-it would cause more transitional
difficulties than create consumer benefits through the lifting of
unnecessary regulation. To be sure, we recognize the artificiality of many
regulated rate structures, but we believe that a politically prudent, fact
sensitive, and more gradual adjustment process will be a superior means
of correcting unjustified rates and transitioning to a more rational
regulatory strategy.
Yet another model of rate deregulation would retain the basic
service rate, as the Working Group does, but sunset that rate by a date
certain, thus doing away with the petitioning process.22 The Working
Group considers this a second-best alternative to the current petitioning
process because it accomplishes the necessary goal of eliminating
distortionary state rate regulation. However, the Working Group also
believes that under a unified framework that encompasses all
communications providers - large and small, urban and rural - there may
be some ongoing need for continued regulation of a basic service package
for certain customers still served only by a single provider. Thus, we
would anticipate that most basic rate regulation would fall to the wayside
under the petitioning process, but could still hold out that it might exist
in small rural pockets of the country for an indeterminate time in the
future.
A final model that the Working Group considered, but opted not to
adopt, would preempt all rate regulation, including the basic service rate,
and leave any subsidy questions (which the basic service rate represents)
to a targeted universal service system. This solution has some attraction
because it eliminates the ongoing distortions in the communications
markets that a below-cost basic service rate represents. It further serves
the goal of equity between providers because for the most part
persistence of this basic service rate represents an ongoing subsidy
21. See Robert C. Atkinson, Dir. of Policy Res., Columbia Inst. for Tele-Information,
Report at Remedies for Telecom Recovery II: What Can the Government Do to Help
Recovery? (Oct. 29, 2004), http://www.citi.columbia.edu/research/recovery2/
CITI-RegulatoryUpdate04.pdf.
22. See, e.g., Raymond L. Gifford & Adam Peters, A Model State Act for
Communications, 11.21 PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND. PROGRESS ON POINT § 4(a)(3),
at 14 (2004), http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/popll.21modelstate.pdf.
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obligation for the incumbent to its basic service customers. There is,
therefore, a strong policy rationale for doing away with all rate regulation
and addressing particular universal service needs for those in need
through a targeted universal service program. In the end, the Working
Group opted to retain the basic service rate as the necessary political
tradeoff for broader rate freedom. To be sure, the pure market-driven
policy perspective would eliminate all state rate regulation and only
subject freely set rates to the broader competition policy inquiry. But we
anticipate that the basic service rate grandfathered here will be of little
importance to the broader communications market as it evolves, and that
in any event it will be petitioned away in most competitive areas of the
nation's market within a reasonably short period of time.
In no event does the Working Group intend this grandfathered rate
to evolve forward to include new packages of services that might someday
be defined as "basic." Stated simply, no new services are to be brought
within the ambit of state rate regulation unless the FCC concludes that
such an approach is warranted under the regulatory framework.
Significantly, with respect to any future evidence of "unfair competition,"
DACA's Title I-Regulatory Framework provides considerable
discretion regarding how to remedy that behavior. As to the exercise of
this discretion, the Working Group presumes that a remedy of rate
regulation for any service, including basic local service, would only be
imposed if it was the most effective one available.
In sum, we emphasize that the general preemptive approach toward
rate regulation eclipses traditional state regulatory activities except where
absolutely necessary. Thus, save for a basic service tariff and local
exchange maps to define that basic service area, all other traditional state
regulatory activities are exchanged for the competition policy standard.
Under this approach, the classic issues associated with tariff-based
regulation (and the concomitant protection of the filed-rate doctrine),
such as rate cases, cost allocation proceedings, cost studies and general
ongoing regulatory supervision, will fall by the wayside.
B. Competition Polcy
Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, state agencies have
played a crucial role in implementing the law's regulatory mandates.
Unfortunately, the FCC and the state agencies have often failed to adopt
a thoughtful and self-conscious approach to regulatory federalism.
Rather, regulatory federalism often has served merely as another
argument for parties to make opportunistically. The challenge for a new
statutory framework-or even in managing the current one-is to
develop a set of clear principles that do not lend themselves to continued
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ad hoc and inconsistent application. 3
Under the FTC-like model proposed by the Regulatory Framework
Working Group, there is the critical question of how to implement what
are almost certainly going to be fact-specific judgments that may well, in
at least some cases, benefit from local fact-gathering and
experimentation. There are two possible models that can be conceived
for dealing with particular competition policy implementation questions.
First, there is a model where all questions are subsumed within the
federal agency. This is how the Federal Trade Commission handles
"unfair competition" inquiries, through the FTC's main office in
Washington, D.C. and through its regional offices. Likewise, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission considers interstate
jurisdictional electric issues using its own administrative processes and
administrative officers. This model clearly makes competition policy a
federal prerogative and avoids the jurisdictional wrangling that the 1996
Act has provoked. Furthermore, it follows the historical models of
airline, interstate trucking and natural gas deregulation, where states
were precluded from an ongoing role in regulating these industries. In so
doing, it solves the problem of states sometimes acting in a capricious or
parochial matter, a problem that has been identified specifically in a "new
economy" competition policy context by Judge Richard Posner.24 Finally,
there are exclusive fields of federal law already, such as bankruptcy,
copyright and patent law. Accordingly, making communications policy
exclusively federal is not unprecedented, even with a decent respect for
23. Philip J. Weiser, Cooperative Federalism and Its Challenges, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL
L. REV. 727, 728-29; see also Atkinson, supra note 21, at 10.
24. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy 10 (Univ. of Chicago,
Working Paper No. 106, 2000), available at www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/
WkngPprs_101-25/106.Posner.pdf. (As Posner explained:
I would like to see the states stripped of their authority to bring antitrust suits,
federal or state, except under circumstances in which a private firm would be able to
sue, as where the state is suing firms that are fixing the prices of goods or services
that they sell to the state. (In other words, only their power to bring parenspatriae
suits would be abrogated.) States do not have the resources to do more than free ride
on federal antitrust litigation, complicating its resolution; in addition they are too
subject to influence by interest groups that may represent a potential antitrust
defendant's competitors. This is a particular concern when the defendant is located
in one state and one of its competitors in another, and the competitor, who is
pressing his state's attorney general to bring suit, is a major political force in that
state. A situation in which the benefits of government action are concentrated in
one state and the costs in other states is a recipe for irresponsible state action. This
is a genuine downside of federalism. The federal government, having a larger and
more diverse constituency, is, as James Madison recognized in arguing for the
benefits of a large republic, less subject to takeover by a faction. I am not myself
inclined to make a fetish of federalism.)
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federalism.25
An alternative model uses state resources to help implement a
unitary federal regulatory scheme. Notably, in the environmental
regulatory arena, there is a regular use of state regulatory resources to
supplement federal oversight. Such use of state resources is at the federal
agency's sole discretion and must be within the state agency's state-
authorized powers, but it is a known model within administrative
regulation. Health care regulation and funding also quite often adhere to
this model through a "waiver federalism" approach. Under a "waiver
federalism" strategy, the federal agency sets the general guidelines and
rules, but a state is free to petition the federal agency for a waiver from
the general rules and implement its own program.26
The extent, if any, of federal delegation of competition policy
authority to states proved to be the most controversial of the Working
Group's issues. A contingent of the Working Group argued for keeping
states out of competition policy issues altogether, fearing inconsistent
outcomes, rogue decision making, and disparate processes. An equally
strong Working Group contingent argued for a narrow delegation to
states to hear matters specifically and solely affecting their given state.
This delegation authority resurrects the old pre-DACA "intrastate"
category as the defining parameter of potential state delegated
jurisdiction. At the same time, a delegation strategy recognizes that
states have adjudicatory systems already in place (and ones more
developed than the FCC's) and that a degree of decisional heterogeneity
is not an "intolerable inconsistency," but rather can sometimes provide
illumination on close competition policy questions (as well as procedural
strategies). Finally, proponents of some delegation authority argued that
the states' adjudicatory capacity might be needed to avoid backlogs and
logjams at an overburdened FCC conducting true administrative
adjudication for the first time.27
In the end, the Working Group could not reach a conclusive
determination on this issue, but instead decided to define the parameters
of the choices and delineate the specific contours of a limited delegation
25. This divided Working Group should hasten to point out, however, that these
exclusive federal legal enclaves of bankruptcy, copyright, and patent are matters assigned to the
federal government by the U.S. Constitution.
26. Waiver federalism models are most often used in situations like Medicaid funding
where the federal and state governments are using matching dollars to fund a given program.
Communications regulation in the pure regulatory sense is obviously different, but there are
parallels in universal service policy.
27. As the report of the Regulatory Framework working group pointed out, a separate
working group is focusing on institutional reform, including proposals to modify the structure
of the FCC. So, the use of the term "FCC" here and elsewhere in this report is meant only to
refer to the sector-specific regulator, however it is ultimately constituted. It is not meant to
imply that the agency necessarily should remain in its current form.
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model.
1. The No Delegation Model
The "no delegation" model is quite simple: all competition policy
questions for all jurisdictional communications providers remain
exclusively within the purview of the FCC and its administrative
adjudicatory arm. Thus, all claims of unfair competition would be tried
and worked out before the FCC. This would include broad, interstate
questions about a general "net neutrality" mandate, as well as specific
questions about whether a small 100 line rural phone company was
abusing a terminating access monopoly. By envisioning that the FCC
would determine all such issues, this model would require some form of
local FCC branch offices or provision for local determinations of such
matters.
The no delegation model ensures a unitary federal regulatory
scheme for electronic communications services, and avoids heterogeneous
decision makers with varying policy agendas. 8  Therefore, the no
delegation model should, in theory, provide more national certainty as to
the competition policy rules governing electronic communications
networks and also streamline regulatory costs and proceedings into a
single agency (i.e., the FCC).
Similarly, the no delegation model should at the very least narrow
the available forums for rent-seeking and other untoward manipulation
of the regulatory process. Moving from a "legislative regulation" model
to a "rule of law" regulatory model suggests an aggregate move from
more to fewer decision makers and toward more adjudication and less
rulemaking. These factors counsel a single, unitary regulator
implementing its decisions consistently across the nation. A no
delegation model accomplishes this goal.29
28. This is only true of course as a formal matter. Within a single agency, there can of
course be divisions and disparate agendas, most notably among professional staff and political
appointees. Nonetheless, the theory of a unitary agency accountable to the president's
appointees should be more likely to generate consistent outcomes than multiple state agencies,
with different political allegiances and disparate competencies.
29. In fairness, it should be noted that the no delegation model also makes the FCC's
faithful implementation of competition policy law and rules all the more important.
Competition policy, understood as maximizing consumer welfare, still has sufficient breadth
and doctrinal disputation to allow latitude to the regulator to be more or less intrusive in
electronic communications services markets. It is sometimes argued that a single national rule
that is bad is preferable to 50 different rules of disparate quality. This sentiment may be more
a function of dissatisfaction with the current dual jurisdiction regulatory system than a
considered view of what a uniform "bad" national rule might mean. One can imagine any
number of catastrophic regulatory actions by an FCC disinclined toward implementing
competition policy.
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2. The Limited Delegation Model
The limited delegation model would be similar in concept to, but
ultimately much narrower and circumscribed than, the 1996 Act's
regulatory framework. Under this model, the DACA would provide an
opportunity for the FCC to delegate authority to state agencies to
implement its competition policy, consistent with a particular issue
within a particular state. This delegation would entail several distinct
elements. First, for a state agency to accept a delegation of federal
authority, it would need to conclude (and the FCC would need to agree)
that it enjoys legal and practical competence to administer the particular
inquiry envisioned by the FCC.3" This determination could include an
evaluation of the ability of a state to follow a particular procedural
approach. Such determinations would not be subject to a collateral
attack or an interlocutory appeal. The use of this threshold requirement
serves several purposes-(1) it ensures that state agencies are not
"commandeered" into a federal regulatory program; (2) it underscores
that state agencies must enjoy appropriate legal authority to implement
federal law, and (3) it acknowledges that at least some state agencies may
need to develop new practical abilities (say, economic and technical
expertise) before taking on more challenging competition policy tasks.3
To the extent that a state agency is either not able or willing to perform
the delegated tasks, the FCC shall assume the appropriate responsibility.
Because the issue delegated to a given state would have to involve just
that state, the FCC could not use this delegation authority to "punt"
tough issues it did not want to have to decide to the states.
To appreciate the mechanics of this approach, consider the case of
an alleged terminating access monopoly being abused by a small, rural
carrier within a given state. In that case, the state agency would need to
conclude that it enjoyed the legal and practical ability to apply whatever
competition policy-based standards the FCC developed to determine
30. This approach to delegation underscores what the Working Group considers a robust
sensitivity to federalism concerns. In particular, states -and specifically state law -would have
to embrace state administration (it need not necessarily be a utility or public service
commission) of a federal regulatory regime. By calling for a self-conscious decision by states to
accept a federal delegation, states will be able to evaluate the opportunity cost, weighting the
direct cost versus the desire for control, of participating in this federal regime. For a discussion
of these issues, see Weiser articles cited supra note 18.
31. For a discussion of the first two issues, see id. For concerns related to the latter, see
Raymond L. Gifford, Regulatory Impressionism: What Regulators Can and Cannot Do, 2
REV. NETWORK ECON. 466, 477 (2003) (arguing that many state agencies "do not have the
time, resources, or abilities to innovate or found new schools of competition policy"), available
at http://www.rnejournal.com/articles/gifford-RNE-10-final.pdf. The "legal competence"
prong is not a pro forma certification either. A robust federalism respects state law sufficiently
to require states to have authorized their utility commission or other regulator under state law
to participate in implementation of a federal statutory framework.
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under what, if any, conditions a particular access pricing practice would
be anticompetitive. By allowing a state to make and enforce its
judgments, the FCC could foster creative experimentation in areas where
the optimal approach was less than clear.
The second aspect of the limited delegation jurisdictional regime is
the recognition that any explicit FCC delegation of authority to state
agencies will often also entail some form of an implicit delegation of
authority. This implicit delegation will often take the form of a "latent
ambiguity"-i.e., a policy question that, although not apparent on the
face of the matter, becomes clear in its application. To address such
issues, state agencies would be authorized-but not required-to certify
issues to the FCC for resolution. This "certification procedure" could
also be used by state agencies to request flexibility not initially granted by
the FCC (i.e., a waiver from the federal regulatory requirements).3 2 The
FCC would be required to decide such matters within 120 days and such
decisions would be subject to appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit. As to a state's resolution of any matter delegated to it by
the FCC (either explicitly or implicitly), any party to the decision could
appeal the state agency's decision to the FCC. If the FCC failed to act
on such petition within a timely manner, any aggrieved party could file a
petition for review with the D.C. Circuit.
To provide a mechanism for state agencies to alert the FCC of their
interest in developing competition policy measures (such as the
terminating access monopoly case discussed above), they would be
required to first file a petition outlining the initiative in question and
their reasoned basis for doing so. If the FCC failed to act on this
petition within 90 days-either to endorse the measure or to bar it-the
proposed proceeding would be deemed permissible. Notably, an FCC
decision to allow a state to proceed to implement a competition policy
measure would only imply that the FCC has made a preliminary
judgment that any measure adopted by the state as a result of such
proceeding is "not inconsistent" with DACA's regulatory framework.
Such an FCC decision would neither immunize the subsequent state
agency decision from challenge in federal district court nor prevent the
FCC from later concluding that the measure in question is inappropriate.
Rather, such a failure to act can be best analogized to a decision by the
Supreme Court to deny a petition for certiorari, which expresses no view
on the merits and leaves open the possibility that it will consider the
question in a later case. Indeed, like the option to expressly tolerate
32. Such a waiver procedure is a frequently used aspect of the Medicaid cooperative
federalism regulatory program. See Judith M. Rosenberg & David T. Zaring, Managing
Medicaid Waivers: Section 1115 and State Health Care Reform, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 545
(1995).
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different approaches, a decision by the FCC not to embrace or reject a
particular regulatory measure can serve to foster experimentation in areas
that are either complex or not well understood by regulatory authorities.
We emphasize that the delegation of adjudicatory authority to state
agencies and the subsequent "appellate" process through the FCC and
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals is intended to follow administrative
adjudicatory procedures and to reinforce DACA's commitment to a rule-
of-law oriented regime.33  In so doing, this regime distributes
adjudicatory resources to handle both a large number of cases as well as
complex inquiries that will turn on specific factual determinations.
Moreover, this regime ultimately unifies the relevant policymaking
process through a single regulatory body (the FCC) that will often act
like an appellate court (albeit subject to the oversight of the D.C.
Circuit) as it develops a uniform body of unfair competition law.
In short, the case for a no-delegation or limited delegation model
depends on how one judges three primary factors: (1) the relative
assessment of the capabilities of states or a federal agency to act with
fidelity toward a competition policy jurisprudence; (2) the level of
confidence in the federal or state agencies' ability to adapt to a rule of
law, adjudicatory model (as opposed to the traditional legislative model);
and (3) the judgment as to whether state involvement would give rise to
more benefits or harms in the administration of competition policy. As
noted above, the Working Group members differed on their evaluation
of these factors and thus whether a no-delegation or limited delegation
model would be preferable.
C. Consumer Protection and Social Policy
Unlike competition policy matters, where our Working Group
believes that the FCC should take the lead in establishing the governing
policy framework, consumer protection and certain social policy concerns
are more properly handled-at least in the first instance-by state
agencies. As Commissioner Kennedy put it, "federal regulators would
never be equipped to accept millions of calls from individual customers
involved in billing disputes" and it makes no sense for "the FCC to
assume the responsibility for addressing these and other consumer
complaints at the retail level."34 Under current practice, state agencies
oversee all carriers within their jurisdiction by, among other things,
requiring certification and managing numbers within the appropriate
area codes. The role of certification requirements, as suggested by the
33. Again, as noted in footnote 27, we recognize that the institutional reform Working
Group may well modify the procedures or institutional structure of the FCC and do not mean
to indicate a preference for a particular set of reforms (or the FCC as it currently operates).
34. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 5.
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above discussion, should be limited either to any FCC-authorized
competition policy measures (under the "Limited Delegation" option) or
appropriate consumer protection or other social policy concerns. Under
no circumstances, however, should certification requirements be any
more burdensome than absolutely necessary to accomplish such concerns,
lest they become a barrier to entry.
In our view, in addition to protecting consumers from "unfair and
deceptive practices" pursuant to DACA's Title I-Regulatory
Framework, states should be allowed to promote public safety and
homeland security, as well as manage public rights-of-way. States and
localities would enjoy leeway in these areas regarding whether and how
to impose any regulatory requirements. Specifically, whether or not the
state or local obligations are expressly anticipated (such as a prohibition
on slamming), states would be permitted, at least as an initial matter, to
adopt any regulations they deemed appropriate. State authority would be
curtailed, however, where the relevant obligations were inconsistent with
federal law, "where there are substantial and clear efficiencies from
eliminating diverse approaches, where a single approach is clearly optimal
over others, or where there is a clear showing that the costs of diversity
outweigh the benefits of state experimentation and implementation.
"3 5
Similarly, where state regulations would create harmful and significant
spillover effects, the FCC would be authorized (and indeed required) to
preempt state regulation, thereby preventing a single state from imposing
its suboptimal policy on the entire country. These "no spillover"
standards are meant to remedy current holes in the Section 332 model
used for wireless services, where reserving consumer protection authority
to states has allowed de facto economic regulation in the name of
consumer protection.
The decision to leave the state agencies with the initial authority to
address these matters reflects the judgment that their proximity and
accessibility to the affected consumers make them the superior institution
to address such matters in the first instance. With respect to the
consumer-affecting matters identified by the Working Group, states
have adopted a range of strategies, including litigation, agency oversight,
and consumer education initiatives. Following such experiments, such as
the early efforts to develop a "do not call list," other states have adopted
best practices and, in many cases, the federal government has embraced
the best of breed and adopted similar measures as federal policy.
35. Weiser, Cooperative Federalism andIts Challenges, supra note 23, at 729.
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IV. THE ROLE OF LOCALITIES IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
REGULATION
The role of localities in telecommunications regulation is an area of
longstanding controversy, particularly insofar as new technologies have
not fit the mold of their established counterparts. This Part discusses
four prominent issues where local authorities have influenced
telecommunications policy: (1) rights-of-way (ROW) management; (2)
the administration of franchise requirements; (3) municipal entry into
telecommunications markets; and (4) telecommunications specific
taxation. We discuss each in turn, noting our respective
recommendations. In general, the Working Group recommends that
authority to act in these areas be given (if at all) to state agencies, with
limited delegation to local authorities.
A. Rights-of- WayAccess and State and Local Regulation
From the perspective of service providers, access to ROW is an
essential predicate to entering a particular market and is often a gating
factor. For localities, regulation of access to ROW is critical to
"minimiz[ing] the damage to their expensive streets, limit[ing] traffic
disruption, and, in some cases, supplement[ing] their general revenue by
taxing carriers' use of [ROW]."36 Given the importance of this issue, it is
most unfortunate that, "almost nine years after the enactment of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, issues regarding access to public
rights-of-way between providers and local authorities continue to be the
focal point for dispute." "
The continuing legal disputes related to ROW issues relate both to
the importance of the issue and the 1996 Act's lack of clear guidance on
it. In 1996, Congress set forth a broad policy (codified in Section 253)
of removing barriers to entry.3" This broad policy contained four distinct
36. James B. Speta, Competitive Neutrality in Right of Way Regulation: A Case Study
in the Consequence of Convergence, 35 CONN. L. REV. 763, 763 (2003).
37. Paul Glist et al., Telecommunications 'Franchising, 818 PLI/PAT 589, 593 (2005).
38. In its entirety, Section 253 provides:
In general
No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal
requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any
entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.
(b) State regulatory authority
Nothing in this section shall affect the ability of a State to impose, on a
competitively neutral basis and consistent with section 254 of this title,
requirements necessary to preserve and advance universal service, protect the
public safety and welfare, ensure the continued quality of telecommunications
services, and safeguard the rights of consumers.
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parts: (1) a call to preempt any state or local regulation that would "have
the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate
or intrastate telecommunications service"; (2) a safe harbor for state
police power activities, including consumer protection; (3) a preservation
of authority to "manage the public rights-of-way," including a right to
"require fair and reasonable compensation from telecommunications
providers, on a competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis"; and
(4) FCC authority to enforce this policy. Like so much of the 1996 Act,
each of these parts has spurred litigation, although many of the contested
issues have yet to reach the Supreme Court.
In a stark reminder of the importance of access to ROW on
reasonable terms, a recent AEI-Brookings Institute report highlighted
that pro-competitive ROW policies are more significant in promoting
broadband deployment than universal service policies. 39 Given the lack
of legal certainty under federal law, different states have adopted
different policies on the appropriate regulation of ROW. In light of the
clear importance of promoting broadband deployment, however, it seems
prudent to adopt a nationwide policy of reasonable access along the lines
of some progressive state policies, such as California's. Under California
law, governmentally imposed charges for ROW access "shall not exceed
the reasonable costs of providing the service for which the fee is
charged."4"
(c) State and local government authority
Nothing in this section affects the authority of a State or local government to
manage the public rights-of-way or to require fair and reasonable
compensation from telecommunications providers, on a competitively neutral
and nondiscriminatory basis, for use of public rights-of-way on a
nondiscriminatory basis, if the compensation required is publicly disclosed by
such government.
(d) Preemption
If, after notice and an opportunity for public comment, the Commission
determines that a State or local government has permitted or imposed any
statute, regulation, or legal requirement that violates subsection (a) or (b) of
this section, the Commission shall preempt the enforcement of such statute,
regulation, or legal requirement to the extent necessary to correct such
violation or inconsistency.
47 U.S.C. § 253 (1996).
39. Scott Wallsten, Broadband Penetration: An Empirical Analysis of State and Federal
Policies (AEI-Brookings Inst. Joint Ctr. on Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 05-12,
2005), available athttp://aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=1161.
40. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50030 (2003). In full, the California law provides:
Any permit fee imposed by a city, including a chartered city, a county, or a city and
county, for the placement, installation, repair, or upgrading of telecommunications
facilities such as lines, poles, or antennas by a telephone corporation that has
obtained all required authorizations to provide telecommunications services from
the Public Utilities Commission and the Federal Communications Commission,
shall not exceed the reasonable costs of providing the service for which the fee is
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The appropriate nationwide policy on rights-of-way access should
not only restrict localities and states to the imposition of any
requirements necessary to legitimate rights of way management, but it
should also limit the payment of fees to those related to costs caused by
the effort to access rights-of-way.41  For states and localities, it is
tempting to levy fees related to, say, gross receipts in order to raise
additional revenue. But such revenues constitute, in effect, a special tax
on telecommunications providers and thus promise to deter the use of
telecommunications services (and slow their deployment). To be sure,
governmental entities highlight that ROWs are governmental property
held in trust for the citizenry. This form of trust is breached, however,
when governmental units take action that (unbeknownst to the citizenry)
restricts the deployment of new technologies.
The various forms of communication technologies call for a broad
definition of "electronic communications providers" which merit
protection under the above provision. In numerous jurisdictions,
providers have litigated the question of whether they fall within the class
of providers entitled to reasonable ROW access. In California, for
example, Williams Communications offered the following explanation,
which an appeals court ultimately embraced:
The [fiber optic] cables do one thing: they carry digitized
optical signals (i.e. l's and O's) for customers, the content of
which is neither controlled nor manipulated by Williams.
Once the digital signals leave the Williams system, customers
convert the signals into different forms of information, such
as voice, music, video, computer data, facsimile material and
other forms. Any particular cable or fiber may carry digital
signals at any given time that will be converted for telephone,
video, Internet and/or other forms of information....
Williams does not and cannot, as a matter of technology,
determine the particular form of information carried on its
lines at or over any given period of time.42
The Working Group concludes that, in calling for a reasonable
access to ROW for all communications providers, it is important that
states or localities not impose other barriers to entry. Consequently, the
Working Group recommends that a revised version of Section 253 not
charged and shall not be levied for general revenue purposes.
Id.; see also Williams Commc'ns v. City of Riverside, 114 Cal. App.4th 642 (2003)
(interpreting provision).
41. See Speta, supra note 36, at 795-802.
42. Williams Commc'ns, 114 Cal. App.4th at 651.
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only explicitly address ROW issues, but also preempt any legal
requirement that "materially inhibits effective entry.
" 41
Finally, the Working Group recommends that states work
cooperatively with local authorities to police consumer fraud, to promote
public safety and homeland security and to manage public rights-of-way.
Accordingly, the proposed legislation allows states to delegate authority
to local authorities to act regarding these issues. To the extent that a
state follows a "home rule" model, such delegation shall be presumed
(including for issues like permitting to lay cable under municipal streets)
unless otherwise provided for by the particular state. In all events,
however, no certification requirement should be unnecessarily
burdensome so as to constitute a barrier to entry or (as discussed below)
to impose requirements such as those traditionally associated with
franchises to operate particular services.
B. Video Franchises
As with calling for a restricted role for governmentally imposed
barriers to entry and limitations on access to rights-of-way, the Working
Group expressed skepticism regarding the continued need for classic
"franchises" imposed on cable television providers. In the case of
telecommunications providers of different services-*say, telephone
service or broadband-it is clear that reasonable access and no barriers to
entry is a critically important public policy. Nonetheless, some localities
maintain that, even as the communications environment moves towards
"everything over Internet Protocol," it is essential that the traditional
cable franchise be allowed to continue. Before engaging the merits of
this issue and the calls for "regulatory parity" between cable providers and
telephone providers of Internet Protocol Television (or IPTV), we
believe that it is important to place this issue in historical context."
1. The Past As Prologue?
Cable television providers were the first new entrants into the
telecommunications market. Before the development of Community
Antenna TV (CATV), television (and radio) broadcasters-along with
local telephone companies-enjoyed a form of franchised monopolies.
In the case of telephone companies, states often legislated bans on entry
and localities (for extra protection) might authorize access to the rights of
43. In so doing, it would resolve a split between the circuits. See Glist et al., supra note
37, at 597-98.
44. For a discussion of this point, see Raymond L. Gifford & Kyle D. Dixon, Progress,
Freedom, and Regulatory Transcendence, 12.7 PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND. PROGRESS
ON POINT 1 (2005), available at http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/pops/popl2.7videoservices.pdf.
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way under exclusive or preferential terms. In the case of television
broadcasters, the Federal Communications Commission used its control
over licenses to restrict competition between broadcasters (under the so-
called Carroll doctrine) .'
After a period of benign neglect, regulation of cable television
providers (then known as CATV) reflected a commitment to "regulatory
parity" or "level playing field" concerns. In particular, federal regulators
concluded that cable providers should act and look just like broadcasters.
To ensure that cable providers looked like broadcasters and were not able
to avoid regulatory burdens imposed upon them, the FCC imposed a
number of requirements, including mandates that they originate local
programs and not provide any "pay TV" services. Under the weight of
these requirements, called by one commentator as "a textbook example of
anti-competitive regulation,"46 cable television providers made only
minimal strides in the marketplace. Over time, however, the FCC and
the courts lifted a number of these restrictions, paving the way for cable
TV's impressive growth in the late 1970s and 1980s.47
The development of satellite television providers (ultimately
through the use of "direct broadcast satellite" or DBS) spurred another
round of regulatory battles and calls for regulatory parity. The FCC
rejected those calls and instituted a regulatory regime that allowed new
entry. In upholding that judgment, the D.C. Circuit remarked that:
Although a regulated industry may come to regard an
agency's policies as immutable elements in the background
against which the industry is set, there is no need for the
agency itself to confuse means with ends; when new
technology permits the statutory objectives to be attained
through novel means that require the alteration or
abandonment of past Commission policies, the Commission
may adjust its means to retail fidelity to the legislative end.
45. See Carroll Broad. Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Policies Regarding
Detrimental Effects of Proposed New Broadcasting Stations on Existing Stations, Report &
Order, 3 FCC Rcd. 638, 1 (1988) (abolishing Carrofldoctrine).
46. Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, The Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the
Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchlne to Ronald Coase's "BigJoke, 14 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 335, 419 (2001) [hereinafter Wireless Craze]; see also Stan Besen & Robert
Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 77 (1981)
(criticizing early regulation of cable television).
47. See, e.g., Amendment of Part 76, Subpart G of the Comm'n Rules and Regulations
Relative to Program Origination by Cable Television Sys., Report & Order, 49 F.C.C.2d
1090 (1974); FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (invalidating, as beyond
FCC's Title I authority, pre-Cable Act requirements for "leased access" channels and channels
dedicated to "public, educational, and governmental", also known as "PEG") programming);
HBO v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (invalidating restrictions on pay television).
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Indeed, the Commission has long been criticized as acting
primarily to preserve the status quo, thus discouraging
innovative technology; when it instead seizes upon the
"comprehensive powers to promote and realize the vast
potentialities of radio" that Congress has conferred upon it,
the Commission is to be commended rather than
castigated.48
Following the light regulatory touch accorded to DBS in its
inception, Congress and the FCC treaded lightly in imposing new
obligations upon it. Ultimately, Congress did impose some of the
traditional requirements on DBS (such as must carry obligations), but it
did so only after the technology developed and in a manner that
respected the technology's limitations.
2. The Cable Franchising Process
The process for obtaining a franchise for cable television ranged
from efforts to emulate Harold Demsetz's theory of franchise regulation
as "competition for a monopoly," to efforts to obtain benefits for a
community through regulated mandates (reflecting Posner's theory of
"taxation by regulation") to out-and-out political deals, enriching
campaign coffers or the pockets of politically connected individuals.49 In
many cases, these franchises imposed forms of rate regulation on
franchised monopolies, along with an array of requirements, including a
mandate to carry public, educational, and governmental channels.
Owing to the requirement to obtain a franchise in every municipality,
one commentator estimated the total number of cable franchises as
34,000.50
In 1984, Congress enacted its first comprehensive legislative
framework to govern cable television providers. Earlier, the FCC (under
its "Title I authority") had developed an array of rules, including federal
mandates for Public, Educational, and Governmental channels, many of
which it later reversed or were challenged successfuilly in court. In
48. Nat'l Ass'n of Broad. v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (internal
citations omitted).
49. For the academic descriptions of franchising as a form of controlling monopoly or as
an alternative to fiscal policy, see Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J. L. & ECON.
55, 63 (1968); Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. &MGMT. SC.
22, 41-42 (1971). For a discussion of the cable industry's earlier years, see generally MARK
ROBICHAUX, CABLE COWBOY: JOHN MALONE AND THE RISE OF THE MODERN CABLE
BUSINESS (2002).
50. Kent Lassman, Franchising in the Local Communications Market, 12.9 PROGRESS
& FREEDOM FOUND. PROGRESS ON POINT 1 (2005), http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/pops/popl2.9franchise.pdf.
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enacting a Title VI to the Communications Acts of 1934, Congress set
forth a clear framework to govern the previous squabbles related to
franchising negotiations (and renewals) as well as put an end to
regulating the rates of cable television providers. After its re-institution
of cable rate regulation in 1992, the 1996 Act restricted the regulation of
cable's rates-owing in large part to the effective entry of DBS providers
under a favorable regulatory environment-and only left intact a
requirement of a regulated basic package of offerings.
In 1996, Congress envisioned an alternative model for entering local
video programming markets through "Open Video Systems" or OVS.n
In theory, the OVS option provided a pathway for telephone companies
to enter the video marketplace.12 Under this mode of entry, providers
could opt for FCC approval rather than a local franchise, although OVS
providers were subject to some common carriage-like requirements.
Nonetheless, whatever appeal that OVS offered largely dissipated when
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the choice of an OVS mode of entry did
not prevent the imposition of additional requirements. 3
Over the last year or so, local telephone companies (notably,
Verizon and AT&T) have outlined a strategy of delivering video
programming over fiber optic networks using Internet Protocol-based
technology. Dubbing their offering "IPTV" (for Internet Protocol
Television), some champions of this offering maintain that it need not
comply with Title VI's classic requirements for a local franchise,
particularly ones relating to building out service to all portions of a
community. In response, both cable companies and municipalities have
insisted on a franchise as a condition of entry and lobbying battles in
some state legislatures and in Congress have ensued.
3. A New Way Forward
In evaluating the model approach for a Digital Age
Communications Act, the Working Group developed a new regulatory
strategy to govern the delivery of video programming that would
recognize the overall economic and technological convergence of services
with other digital electronic communications services. In so doing, we
recognized that the continuing rate regulation of a basic package of video
51. 47 U.S.C. § 573 (1996).
52. In the 1996 Act, Congress repealed a longstanding ban (forged from a fear of
anticompetitive tactics) on telephone company entry into video markets . See Pub. L. 104-
104, § 302(b)(1) (repealing 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)). Prior to this repeal, the courts, which
originally tolerated this ban, were growing increasingly skeptical of its legality. Compare Gen.
Tel. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971) (upholding ban), and Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 202 (4th Cir. 1996) (invalidating ban),
vacated as moot, 516 U.S. 415 (1996)..
53. See City of Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 347-48 (5th Cir. 1999).
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offerings had become antiquated and that an overly cumbersome
franchising process for IPTV providers represented a formidable entry
barrier.5 4 Consequently, we embraced a revised framework that, at a
state's option, would provide for statewide certifications that would entail
no rate regulation or build-out requirements.
The Working Group recommends that states and localities not be
allowed to impose rights-of-way or certification requirements on
providers to the extent they rely on spectrum or other non-physical
means to reach customers. We determined that, in those circumstances,
providers will not affect public rights-of-way sufficiently to justify such
requirements. We recognize that the limitation on state authority results
in disparate treatment of these providers compared with providers which
deploy physical networks (e.g., optical fiber, coaxial cable) to connect
their customers. Although states must retain limited authority to prevent
providers relying on physical networks from disrupting roads and other
public infrastructure, such need is largely absent with respect to providers
relying on non-physical networks. The Working Group decided that
extending regulation where it is not needed simply to promote "parity"
would undermine DACA's broader goal of promoting investment and
innovation by avoiding unnecessary regulation of electronic
communications services.
A similar desire to avoid unnecessary regulation prompted the
Working Group to preclude state or local network "build-out"
requirements. In theory, build-out requirements may be a plausible
strategy for ensuring universal service by a monopoly provider. For a
second entrant, however, the universal access concerns are irrelevant,
making such a requirement entirely redundant and a barrier to entry for
areas that would warrant competition. To be sure, we recognize a
plausible equity concern that the first entrant has born the added
responsibility of a build out requirement (that may not be profitable) and
thus some Working Group members supported a "universal service fee"
for IPTV providers. The majority of the group, however, concluded that
54. Would-be entrants have criticized the cumbersome regulatory process at the local
level, explaining that:
[T]o anyone who has actually tried to build a competitive system, it is painfully
obvious that local regulators have become the bottleneck in the system. These
regulators have emerged as neighborhood tyrants, protecting existing local and
regional monopolies and effectively holding competitive broadband hostage. By
creating unreasonable demands on any new entrant to the market, local regulators
have slowed the advancement of broadband at the very moment when the telecom
industry might finally be ready to enter the new age of innovation.
David McCourt, What's a Polite Word for "Shakedown?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2005, at A9.
Although there are, to be sure, local regulators who have facilitated robust entry, persistent
complaints from the competitive community regarding local regulators persuade the Working
Group that change like that proposed here is warranted.
J ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
the historic incumbency and first mover advantages that accompanied
the requirement more than offset its burdens.
With respect to the use of a certification process, the Working
Group agreed that there were notable ways in which the traditional
franchising obligations (such as Public, Educational, and Governmental
(PEG) channels) failed to live up to their initial aspirations (or, in the
views of some, were misguided from the outset). In particular, local
jurisdictional control of these channels or a limited amount of creativity
and flexibility led to a number of disadvantages in the form of preventing
sensible regional cooperation, sharing of facilities, and uses of alternative
technologies (including websites, podcasting, and other viable forms of
new media). While some members of the group pressed the strategy of
reforming such franchise obligations by incorporating them into a
statewide oversight process, the majority converged on the plan of
eliminating them altogether. In so doing, the majority suggested that, to
the extent states and localities wish to support video programming, they
should work collaboratively with providers to ensure that such
programming is delivered to their citizens (either on a purchased or
contributed basis).
The Working Group recognizes that many state and local
authorities have relied on franchise terms and conditions as means of
benefiting their citizens. Thus, although we eliminate these features for
the above reasons, we provide a transition period to provide some time
for states and localities to make other arrangements. Specifically, we
require the terms of existing franchises to be honored for a reasonable
period, such as 3-5 years. Further, to lessen the disparity between
incumbent cable franchise and telephone companies entering the video
market, we afford states discretion to allocate an equitable portion of the
costs of franchise fees and public access channels on telephone companies
providing video programming. Although this approach does not
eliminate all disparities or distinctions based on technology, we view this
transition as an appropriate accommodation for state and local reliance
interests and conclude that any ill effects associated with the terms of the
transition will be mitigated by its short duration.
In envisioning video franchisees in a more flexible and creative light,
it is also important to ensure that they do not impede entry. By replacing
the franchising process with optional certification at the statewide level,
we believe that transaction costs will be limited and that entry will be
expedited. Finally, in terms of the particular state institution to manage
this process, we follow the precedent of the Universal Service Working
Group and conclude that it should be the state public utility commission
unless the State Legislature appoints a different body to do so.
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C. MunicipalEntry
One issue that has attracted considerable heat (and often little light)
over the last year is the prospect of municipalities entering into the
telecommunications marketplace. In general, the Working Group is
skeptical that municipalities can provide more effective services than
their private sector counterparts."5 Moreover, the Working Group also
notes that, where municipalities make large scale investments, there is a
possibility that they will use the police power (or taxing authority) to
ensure that they are recovered. 6 Such concerns are notable, but for the
reasons set forth below, we do not believe that a federal ban on municipal
provision of telecommunications services-through wireless or other
technologies-is appropriate.
In addressing this issue, we begin by noting that state law
limitations on municipal entry raise an issue entirely separate from
federal law limits. In terms of sovereignty, local municipalities rely on
state law to empower them (often through a "home rule" regime).
Because municipalities are creations of state law, we are mindful that
efforts to protect localities against state regulation raise serious
intergovernmental concerns. Consequently, we leave to the states
whether or not to restrict municipal entry into telecommunications
markets.
In declining to recommend legislation on this issue, we will suggest
that it is quite plausible that reasonable cases of municipal entry into
local telecommunications markets may exist. In particular, for local
public safety applications (such as transmitting pictures of suspects in
real-time), high speed access is an increasing concern. To the extent that
commercial providers have not developed high speed networks to provide
such functionality, a locality may well choose to contract for its
construction for use by its public safety agencies. Once such a network is
constructed, moreover, it may well be feasible to provide priority access
to public safety and also allow the public to benefit from broadband
connectivity. There may also be some sparsely populated communities
unserved by commercial service providers where a municipal network
may be the "last best hope" for affordable broadband access. Finally,
other instances of market failure may justify municipal involvement in
building broadband networks.
55. For a discussion of the research calling into doubt the effectiveness of municipal
entry, see Thomas M. Lenard, Government Entry into the Telecom Business: Are the
Benefits Commensurate With the Costs?, 11.3 PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND. PROGRESS
ON POINT 1 (2004), http://www.pff.org /pdf/16306.pdf.
56. For a discussion of this concern, see Anticompetitive Threats Aom Public Utilities:
Are Small Businesses Losing Out?: Before the H Comm. on Small Business, 109th Cong.
12-23 (2005) (statement of Adam Peters, Research Fellow, Progress & Freedom Found.).
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Stated more generally, we are wary of instituting categorical
limitations on municipal development of broadband or other
communications technologies until we know more about their actual
usage and cost characteristics. Rather, we suggest close scrutiny of them,
confident that mistaken investments will defer other foolhardy efforts,
and that legal safeguards against anticompetitive conduct should be
vigilantly applied where appropriate. In particular, the Working Group
notes that anticompetitive behavior is a promising strategy for
municipally-backed market entrants and therefore would subject them to
the same "unfair competition" standard as other market players.5 7
D. State and Local Taxation
The final way in which state and localities can hamper the
development of electronic communications services is through industry
specific taxation. With respect to taxation, we noted above that
imposing costs on a particular industry-such as through excise taxes or
rights-of-way fees-can deter the use of that industry's products or
services. In cases where the tax is imposed on a "social bad," say,
cigarettes, or even where the tax reflects a close proxy to a publicly
provided resource (say, the relationship of gas to the funding of roads),
deterring usage may not present a grave concern. But where the tax or
fee is imposed as a means of raising general revenues, policymakers
should be wary of singling out a specific industry. In the case of
telecommunications, such taxes appear to be on the rise and thus are
increasingly troubling."8 For that reason, we call for preemption of all
industry-specific taxation on electronic communications services.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we emphasize that the Report's direction and the
associated draft statutory language adhere as closely as possible to the
following principles:
Pro-competitive-Consumer welfare-driven competition policy is
the overarching theme of DACA, outlined in the Regulatory
Framework, and continued in this report. In authorizing state
regulation, this framework emphasizes the role of a more rigorous, robust
competition policy analysis and provides a mechanism for preempting
regulations that are not so justified.
57. David E.M. Sappington & J. Gregory Sidak, Competition Law for State-Owned
Enterprises, 71 ANTITRUST L. J. 514 (2003); Timothy J. Muris, Clanritng the State Action
and Noerr Exemptions, 27 HARV. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 443 (2004).
58. Dennis Cauchon, City, State Cell Phone Taxes on the Rise, USA TODAY, May 8,
2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-05-08-cellphone-taxesx.htm.
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Generality-The language aspires to be concise and general, as
opposed to prosaic and prescriptive. Statutory delegations relating to a
dynamic sector like communications regulation must be able to adapt to
the rapidly changing circumstances, and not get bogged down in special
provisions and specific carve-outs for favored (or against disfavored)
entities.
Neutrality-The language aspires to bring all platforms and all
regulatory jurisdictions within a unitary policy framework, administered
by the FCC but cognizant of the states' comparative advantage in some
roles.
Practicality-The federal/state framework recognizes the role of
state regulation, its political vitality and its possible salutary purpose.
The proposal recognizes traditional state roles relating to consumer
protection, public safety, homeland security and management of public
rights-of-way. It likewise preserves the ability to potentially retain a
basic service rate, without undue distortion of the competitive market.
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APPENDIX A: MODEL PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE
The Digital Age Communications Act
Title 11-ALLOCATION OF FEDERAL, STATE AND
LOCAL RESPONSIBILITY
Section 1: Findings
(a) FINDINGS. The Congress finds the following:
that technological and market forces are changing the nature and
delivery of electronic communications services;
that these technological and market changes have altered the
necessary roles for federal, state and local authorities in regulating
electronic communications services;
that, in many cases, responsibility to regulate activities relating to
communications has been allocated to a state or local jurisdiction based
on whether such activities were deemed to occur within that jurisdiction;
that as electronic communications services and technologies become
increasingly digital and packet-based, it has become difficult, and often
impossible, to rely on jurisdictional boundaries as the basis for allocating
regulatory responsibility among jurisdictions;
that a regulatory regime enforced by multiple jurisdictions, based on
disparate laws, may result in inconsistent, unpredictable and onerous
rules that inhibit investment, innovation and competition;
that the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which made substantial
changes in the allocation of responsibilities among regulators in different
jurisdictions, nonetheless did not adopt a framework that addresses fully
the challenges posed by the rapid technological and marketplace
evolution of electronic communications networks and services; and
that given these shortcomings, new statutory guidance for allocating
federal, state and local responsibility is necessary to achieve the purposes
of regulating electronic communications networks and services.
(b) POLICY. In light of the findings in subsection (a), it is the
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policy of the United States:
to integrate federal, state and local regulation of electronic
communications networks, as developed by this and other titles of this
Digital Age Communications Act;
that electronic communications networks and services be governed
by a single, unified, minimally pervasive regulatory regime determined
and generally implemented at the federal level;
to eliminate rate regulation and rate-setting where market
conditions adequately protect consumers' interest in reasonable rates;
to eliminate regulation based on technological or functional
distinctions among communications services and networks;
to avoid extending legacy regulation to additional services, networks
or providers;
to create incentives to invest in new technologies and encourage the
deployment of advanced electronic communications services.
Section 2: State Regulation of Basic Local Rates
(a) GRANDFATHERED RATE REGULATION. Subject to
the limitations of subsection (b), (c) and (d), a state may continue to
regulate the rate for a basic, stand-alone local service. To qualify as such
a service, immediately prior to the date of enactment of this Digital Age
Communications Act, the service must have been (and must continue to
be):
(1) offered separately from any other services to customers who
are not providers of electronic communications services;
(2) of the type defined in 47 U.S.C. § 254 (c)(1), as interpreted
by 47 C.F.R. § 54.101(a);
(3) provided via a circuit-switched telephone network; and
(4) lawfully regulated by the state.
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(b) Rate regulation authority under this section shall not extend to
any ancillary or vertical services offered in connection with basic,
standalone local service, or apply to any service bundles that contain basic
standalone local service as a component.
(c) Neither the Federal Communications Commission nor the
states shall have rate regulation authority over any other retail or end-
user electronic communications service except under section 3(a) of this
Title II, or as authorized under Title I, Section 3: Unfair Methods of
Competition Unlawful of this Digital Age Communications Act.
(d) REFORM OF RATE REGULATION. Parties at any time
may petition a state authority to modify or eliminate its regulation of
rates that otherwise would be preserved pursuant to subsection (a).
(1) The state authority receiving such a petition shall issue an
order disposing of the petition within 270 days of receiving
the petition or it will be deemed granted. For every service
for which a state determines to continue to regulate the
rate, the order shall demonstrate that the rate meets the
qualifications of subsections (a) and (b) and (c) and shall
also explain why the economic benefits of such regulation
(or non-regulation) outweigh its economic harms.
(2) Parties may petition the Federal Communications
Commission to review aspects of proceedings conducted
pursuant to subsection (d)(1), including petitions to modify
or eliminate rate regulation that are deemed denied.
(3) Within 180 days of receiving such a petition, the Federal
Communications Commission shall issue an order
preempting regulation of any rates that do not remedy
methods or practices deemed unlawful pursuant to Title I,
Section 3: Unfair Methods of Competition Unlawful. If
the Commission fails to act within 180 days of receiving
such a petition, it will be deemed denied.
(4) Parties may appeal the grant or denial of a petition
pursuant to subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.
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Section 3: Implementation of Title I, Regulatory Framework
[No Delegation Option]*
(a)*The Federal Communications Commission shall be the sole
agency with jurisdiction to implement regulation and conduct
adjudications under Title I-Regulatory Framework, except as specified in
Section 4: State and Local Regulation.*
(b)*The Federal Communications Commission may not delegate
authority to states to promote competition among providers of electronic
communications services.*
[Limited Delegation Option]*
(a) 'COMMISSION-INITIATED DELEGATIONS. Except as
expressly provided in Sections 2, 3(b) and 4 of this Title, the Federal
Communications Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction and
authority to enact or implement rules, regulations or obligations, or
conduct rulemakings or adjudications, under Title I-Regulatory
Framework.**
(b)*For matters occurring wholly within a given state or locality,
the Federal Communications Commission may delegate to that state or a
subdivision thereof the authority to enforce any rules, regulations or
obligations enacted or determined by the Federal Communications
Commission under Title I - Regulatory Framework, or adjudicate
disputes between providers of electronic communications services that
implicate such rules, regulations or obligations."
(1) **A delegation of authority pursuant to subsection (b) will
be deemed invalid if the state or locality does not certify,
and the Federal Communications Commission does not
concur, that the state or locality is legally and practically
competent to implement the action the Commission seeks
to delegate. Such determinations will not be subject to
collateral attack or interlocutory appeal.**
(2) **If a state or locality declines to accept, lacks authority or
otherwise fails to implement a delegation of authority
pursuant to subsection (c), upon public notice, the Federal
Communications Commission shall assume responsibility
for implementing that delegation.**
(3) 'A state or locality may petition the Federal
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Communications Commission to clarify the scope of a
delegation of authority pursuant to subsection (c) or to
obtain a waiver from any express or implied limitations on
such delegation. Within 120 days of receiving such a
petition, after affording interested parties the opportunity
for comment, the Federal Communications Commission
shall issue an order granting or denying the petition or it
will be deemed granted.
(c) **Parties may appeal all decisions of the Federal
Communications Commission or any state or subdivision thereof, as
applicable, arising from this Section to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit."
(d) **PETITIONS FOR DELEGATION. In the absence of
delegated authority pursuant to subsection (b), a state or locality seeking
to impose obligations among providers of electronic communications
services under Title I, Regulatory Framework must petition the Federal
Communications Commission for approval or denial of the proposed
obligations.**
(1) "*Within 90 days of receiving such a petition, the Federal
Communications Commission shall issue an order granting
or denying such petition or it will be deemed denied. Such
determinations will not be subject to collateral attack or
interlocutory appeal.'
(2) 'After an appropriate notice and comment in response to a
petition by any party-or on its own motion-the Federal
Communications Commission may preempt actions taken
in response to the granted petition, provided the
Commission satisfies the requirements of Section 5:
Limitations on State and Local Authority."
(3) "State or localities may only petition under this subsection
(d) as to matters contained and confined wholly within the
petitioner's jurisdictional boundary."
Section 4: State and Local Regulation
(a) AUTHORITY OF STATES. Notwithstanding Section 3, and
subject to Section 5 of this Title, states or subdivisions thereof retain
jurisdiction to enact and implement rules or regulations that the state or
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subdivision thereof determines, after notice and an opportunity for public
comment, are minimally and directly necessary to:
(1) Prohibit unfair or deceptive acts or practices that would
negatively affect consumers from using electronic
communications services, including, by way of example,
concealment of the terms and conditions affecting the price
and quality of such services;
(2) Protect public safety and homeland security;,
(3) Manage public rights-of-way and execute traditional police
powers with respect to public spaces, provided that any fees
imposed for access to rights-of-way shall not exceed the
actual direct costs incurred by the state or subdivision
thereof in managing the electronic communications service
provider's use of such rights-of-way.
(b) SCOPE OF STATE AUTHORITY. Nothing in subsection
(a) should be interpreted to otherwise allow states or localities:
(1) to implement Title I-Regulatory Framework;
(2) to enact forms of rate, quality-of-service or other forms of
economic regulation except as expressly permitted under
this Title; or
(3) to impose requirements pursuant to subsection (a) on
providers of electronic communications services to the
extent they rely on networks that connect to customers
primarily through use of electromagnetic spectrum or other
non-physical means.
(c) CERTIFICATION AND RIGHT-OF-WAY
AUTHORIZATION. Providers of electronic communications services
shall be authorized to construct or operate an electronic communications
network over public rights-of-way, and through easements within the
state, except that in using such easements the provider of electronic
communications services shall ensure -
(1) that the safety, functioning and appearance of the property
and the convenience and the safety of other persons not be
adversely affected by the installation or construction of
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facilities necessary for the electronic communications
network;
(2) that the cost of the installation, construction, operation or
removal of such facilities be borne by the provider of
electronic communications services or subscriber or a
combination of both; and
(3) that the owner of the property be justly compensated by the
provider of electronic communications services for any
damages caused by the installation, construction, operation
or removal of such facilities by the provider, provided that a
state or subdivision thereof shall not impose fees in excess
of the costs not already covered under subsection (a)(3).
(4) any provider may petition the Federal Communications
Commission for review of a state's or a locality's
determinations under this section (c) pursuant to Section 5:
Limitations on State and Local Authority.
(d) AUTHORITY OF LOCALITIES.
(1) Any locality that provides electronic communications
services is subject to Title I, Section 3: Unfair Methods of
Competition Unlawful.
(e) TRANSITION AND SUNSET FOR EXISTING
AGREEMENTS.
(1) Providers of electronic communications services that,
according to state law as of the date of enactment of this
Digital Age Communications Act, remain bound by
existing agreements adopted pursuant to section 47 U.S.C.
§541 shall satisfy all terms and conditions of such
agreements for 4 years from the date of enactment,
whichever is later.
(2) States and localities may not renew, extend or otherwise
subject any provider of electronic communications services
to the agreements described in subsection (e)(1) beyond the
duration specified in that subsection.
(3) Until the termination of an existing franchise agreement
pursuant to subsection (e)(1), states may require any
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provider of competing video service that may be certificated
pursuant to subsection (b) to contribute an equitable
portion of the costs associated with any fees and public
access channels directly attributable to the agreement.
Section 5: Limitations on State and Local Authority
LIMITATION. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 3 and
4 of this Title, state and local authorities are hereby preempted and thus
without authority to regulate electronic communications services or
networks whenever the Federal Communications Commission concludes
that
(1) state or local such regulation would be inconsistent with
federal law;
(2) there are substantial and clear efficiencies from eliminating
diverse regulatory approaches;
(3) a single regulatory approach is clearly optimal over others;
(4) there is a clear showing that the costs of diverse regulatory
approaches outweigh the benefits of state and local
experimentation and implementation;
(5) a single regulatory approach is dearly optimal over others;
(6) materially inhibits any provider (other than a state or
locality) from effectively offering an electronic
communications service;
(7) state or local such regulation would be inconsistent with the
policy goals articulated in Section 1(b) of this Title; or
(8) state or local authorities have imposed a tax solely on some
or all providers of electronic communications services.
PREEMPTION. If, after notice and an opportunity for public
comment, the Federal Communications Commission determines that a
state or local authority has imposed any statute, regulation or legal
requirement that violates subsection (a), the Commission shall preempt
the enforcement of such statute, regulation or legal requirement to the
extent necessary to correct such violation or inconsistency. Where the
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Commission reviews a state or local statute, regulation or legal
requirement in response to a petition for preemption, rather than on its
own motion, it shall grant or deny the petition within 180 days of
receiving it, or it will be deemed denied. Parties may appeal the grant or
denial of such a petition to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit.
